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With  the  dissemination  of non-invasive  human  neuroimaging  techniques  such  as  fMRI and  the  advance-
ment  of  cognitive  science,  neuroimaging  studies  focusing  on  emotions  and  social  cognition  have  become
established.  Along  with  this  advancement,  behavioral  economics  taking  emotional  and  social  factors
into  account  for economic  decisions  has  been  merged  with  neuroscientiﬁc  studies,  and  this  interdis-
ciplinary  approach  is  called  neuroeconomics.  Past  neuroeconomics  studies  have  demonstrated  that






research  ﬁeld  that  investigates  the role of  central  neurotransmitters  in  this  process  is worthy  of further
development.  Here,  we provide  an  overview  of  recent  molecular  neuroimaging  studies  to further  the
understanding  of the  neurochemical  basis  of  “irrational”  or emotional  decision-making  and  the  future
direction,  including  clinical  implications,  of  the  ﬁeld.
© 2013  Elsevier  Ireland  Ltd  and  the  Japan  Neuroscience  Society.  Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
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. Introduction
With the dissemination of non-invasive human neuroimag-
ng techniques such as fMRI and the advancement of cognitive
cience, neuroimaging studies regarding emotions, social cogni-
ion (Theory of Mind) and moral cognition became established
rom the late 1990s (Adolphs, 2002; Frith and Frith, 2003; Lamm
t al., 2011; Moll et al., 2005; Takahashi et al., 2004). This gen-
ral period was also an important time for the advancement of
ehavioral or experimental economics. In normative economics
heory, decision makers are assumed to be “rational” and purely
elf-interested. However, we are not always rational, and some-
imes show other regarding preference (e.g. charity, moral decision
tc.). Laboratory and ﬁeld evidence from behavioral economics has
hown that decision-makers systematically depart from normat-
ve theory (Camerer and Loewenstein, 2004; Camerer and Fehr,
006; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). Because behavioral eco-
omics deals with the effects of emotional and social factors on
conomic decisions, not surprisingly, it has been merged with
euroscientiﬁc studies about emotions or social cognition, and
his interdisciplinary approach is called neuroeconomics (Fehr and
amerer, 2007; Levallois et al., 2012). Since Daniel Kahneman and
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Open access undeVernon Smith were awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics for
their contributions to the establishment of behavioral or exper-
imental economics in 2002, neuroeconomics research has been
accelerating (Fehr and Camerer, 2007; Glimcher et al., 2005; Sanfey
et al., 2003; Takahashi et al., 2009). Past neuroeconomics studies
have investigated the neural basis of “irrational” or “emotional”
decision-making that violates normative theory, demonstrating
that, in addition to cortical regions such as the prefrontal cortex
(PFC), subcortical emotion-related brain structures play a major
role in “irrational” decision-making (Fehr and Camerer, 2007).
The next question then is how modulatory neurotransmission is
involved in these central processes (Rangel et al., 2008). Here, we
provide an overview of recent efforts to understand the neuro-
chemical basis of “emotional” decision-making under risks.
2.  Emotional decision-making under risks
2.1. Neuroscientiﬁc studies of nonlinear probability weighting
Normative economics theory in decision-making under risks
assumes that decision-makers combine probabilities and valuation
(utility) of possible outcomes in some way, most typically by taking
the probability-weighted expectation over possible utilities. How-
ever, our daily experiences and empirical evidence tell us that we
systematically violate the normative theory. One type of system-
atic violation of normative economics theory is that people tend
to weight objective probabilities nonlinearly. Decision-makers
often overestimate low probabilities (e.g. playing lotteries) and
r CC BY-NC-ND license.
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Fig. 1. Hypothesized model showing the contribution of central DA tone to nonlin-
ear  probability weighting. A smaller value of  ˛ (closer to 0) means a more nonlinear
inﬂected weighting function and a higher value (closer to 1) means a more linear









































mole  in distorting probability weighting function nonlinearly. Excessive DA tone
ight cause exaggerated overestimation of low probability and underestimation
f  moderate to high probabilities.
nderestimate high probabilities. A leading alternative to normat-
ve theory (expected utility theory) is the prospect theory (Tversky
nd Kahneman, 1992). One of the important components of the
rospect theory is nonlinear probability weighting, where objective
robabilities, p, are transformed nonlinearly into decision weights
(p) by a weighting function (Fig. 1).
From a psychological point of view, the overweighting of
ow-probability gains may  reﬂect the hope of winning, and under-
eighting of high-probability gains may  reﬂect the fear of losing
 “near sure thing”. In this sense, nonlinear probability weight-
ng is called “emotional” decision-making. Experimental studies
uggest that the weighting function is regressive, asymmetric, and
nverse S-shaped, crossing the diagonal from above at an inﬂec-
ion point (around 1/3) where p = w(p). Although several functions
ave been proposed to express nonlinear probability weighting,
he one-parameter function derived axiomatically by Prelec (1998),
(p) = exp{−(ln(1/p))˛} with 0 <  ˛ < 1, is widely used. In an inverse
-shaped nonlinear weighting function, low probabilities are over-
eighted and moderate to high probabilities are underweighted.
he function neatly explains the typically observed pattern of risk-
eeking for low probability gain and risk aversion toward high
robability gain.
The neural correlates related to nonlinear probability transfor-
ation were investigated using fMRI with a certainty equivalent
rocedure (Paulus and Frank, 2006). During this procedure, a gam-
le’s certainty equivalent, the amount of sure payoff at which a
layer is indifferent between the sure payoff and the gamble, was
etermined. It was reported that differential anterior cingulate
ctivation during estimation of high probabilities relative to low
robabilities was positively correlated with Prelec’s nonlinearity
arameter ˛ across subjects. Another fMRI study with risks of neg-
tive outcomes (electric shocks) found similar nonlinear response
n brain regions including the caudate/subgenual anterior cingu-
ate (Berns et al., 2008). Tobler et al. (2008) reported that the
orsolateral PFC was involved in overweighting low probabilities
nd underweighting high probabilities, and that the ventral frontal
egions showed the opposite pattern. However, more recently,
he degree of nonlinearity in the striatal response to anticipated
eward was shown to reﬂect the nonlinearity parameter as esti-
ated behaviorally (Hsu et al., 2009). The discrepancies regardingearch 75 (2013) 269–274
the loci of activation are thought to stem from differences in the task
(probability range, context, etc.) and parameter estimation method.
However, elucidating the role of the dopamine (DA) system in non-
linear probability weighting would seem promising, considering
the fact that DA is linked to risk-seeking behavior (Leyton et al.,
2002) and excessive DA release was observed in pathological gam-
bling in Parkinson’s disease patients (Steeves et al., 2009). Trepel
et al. (2005) hypothesized in an insightful review that DA trans-
mission in the striatum might be involved in shaping probability
weighting. Taking advantage of in vivo molecular neuroimaging, we
investigated the relationship between central DA transmission and
nonlinear probability weighting by positron emission tomography
(PET).
Using a certainty equivalent procedure, we  estimated probabil-
ity weighting with Prelec’s one-parameter function outside the PET
scanner. There was  positive correlation between striatal D1 recep-
tor binding measured by [11C]SCH23390 PET and the nonlinearity
parameter  ˛ of weighting function (Fig. 2) (Takahashi et al., 2010a).
No correlation was  found between D2 receptor binding measured
by [11C]raclopride PET and nonlinearity parameter ˛. That is, sub-
jects with lower striatal D1 receptor binding tend to show more
pronounced overestimation of low probabilities and underestima-
tion of high probabilities. Although [11C]SCH23390 is a selective
radioligand for D1 receptors, it also has some afﬁnity for sero-
tonin (5-HT) 2A receptors. 5HT2A receptor density in the striatum
is negligible compared to D1 receptor density. However, 5HT2A
receptor density is never negligible in extrastriatal regions, and it
was reported that approximately one-fourth of the cortical signal
of [11C]SCH23390 was due to binding to 5HT2A receptors (Ekelund
et al., 2007). Future studies with a more selective radioligand are
recommended to test the role of extrastriatal (cortical) D1 receptors
in nonlinear weighting.
Mis-estimation of probabilities, especially of low probabilities,
might be related to some problematic behaviors in neuropsychi-
atric disorders. Clinical studies have reported the emergence of
pathological gambling in Parkinson’s disease patients taking DA
agonist medication (Dagher and Robbins, 2009; Gallagher et al.,
2007), and such patients showed exaggerated DA release in the
ventral striatum measured by [11C]raclopride PET during gambling
(Steeves et al., 2009). Although pathological gambling is a hetero-
geneous disorder and cannot be solely attributed to mis-estimating
probability, these observations can lead to the hypothesis that
excessive DA transmission might cause distortion of subjective
probability weights for gains (positive outcomes) (Fig. 1). On
the basis of this hypothesis, circumstantial evidence can lead us
to the conjecture of a vicious-cycle mechanism for developing
drug/gambling addiction as follows: Reduced striatal D1 binding
(which might in part be determined by genetic information) is
linked to a risk-seeking trait. The risk-seeking trait is linked to
enhanced activation and DA release in the striatum during risk-
seeking behavior (Leyton et al., 2002; St Onge and Floresco, 2009).
Chronic exposure to unusually high release of DA might lead to
down-regulation of D1 receptors (Moore et al., 1998; Yasuno et al.,
2007). Further decrease in D1 receptor binding would then lead to
further risk-seeking. Reduced striatal D1 binding could therefore
be a gateway to a vicious cycle, creating a predisposition to drug
addiction and pathological gambling. In fact, a recent study sug-
gested that reduced D1 receptor binding may  be associated with an
increased risk of relapse in drug addiction (Martinez et al., 2009).
However, nonlinear probability weighting is a combination of
risk-seeking (overestimation of low probability) and risk-aversion
(underestimation of high probability). In fact, a recent study
reported that pathological gamblers demonstrated an overall shift
toward risk, rather than excessive distortion of nonlinear prob-
ability weighting in decision-making under risks (Ligneul et al.,
2012). Thus, the shape of weighting function, especially in the










































framing effect. Homozygosity for s allele showed greater amyg-
dala activation during decision-making and stronger framing effect
than l carriers (Roiser et al., 2009). More recently, large-sample
behavioral economics studies in a Chinese sample also showed that
Fig. 3. Hypothesized model showing the contribution of central 5HT  and NE tone
to  loss aversion. 5-HT and NE might contribute to shaping the slope of value func-ig. 2. Relationship between striatal DA D1 receptors and nonlinear probability
11C]SCH23390 is shown and (B) positive correlation between striatal D1 receptor b
igh-probability portion, should be determined by multiple neuro-
ransmitters other than DA (Takahashi et al., 2010b),  such as 5-HT
Takahashi et al., 2005) and NE (Onur et al., 2009), which are also
nown to modulate the emotional reaction of fear. Furthermore,
he role of modulatory neurotransmitters in shaping weighting
unction for losses (negative outcomes) should be tested as well.
.2. Neuroscientiﬁc studies of loss aversion
Distaste derived from losing a certain amount of money appears
o be greater than the pleasure derived from gaining the equiva-
ent amount. Imagine having a chance to participate in a coin-ﬂip
ame of chance. Using a fair coin, if the result is heads, you will
in $100, and if the result is tails, you will lose $100. Are you will-
ng to participate in this gamble? Typically, most people would say
no”. Well, how about the following gamble? If the winning prize
s increased to $200, while the potential loss remains $100. In this
ase, some people would say “yes”. This means that, typically, losses
ave at least twice the impact of equivalent gains, a property called
oss aversion (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). Many laboratory and
eld studies have found evidence in monkeys for food rewards,
nd in humans for ﬁnancial outcomes, features of consumer goods,
ood rewards, game show winnings, and apartment sales (Camerer
nd Loewenstein, 2004; Chen et al., 2006; Knutson et al., 2007). In
rospect theory, this is modeled by a value function of losses that
s steeper than that of gains (Fig. 3).
A fMRI study reported that the PFC and striatum are involved in
oss aversion (Tom et al., 2007). Brain lesion studies have reported
hat amygdala lesion patients showed diminished loss aversion
De Martino et al., 2010). Sokol-Hessner et al. (2009) have shown
hat physiological arousal response (skin conductance response) to
osses was greater than to equivalent gains on average. This means
hat losses are more emotionally laden and salient than equivalent
ains. The study also reported that individuals with greater arousal
esponse to losses versus gains tend to be more loss-aversive.
ore recently, the same research team, using fMRI, revealed that
ehavioral loss aversion was correlated with amygdala activation
n response to losses relative to gains (Sokol-Hessner et al., 2012).
It is widely acknowledged that 5-HT plays a major role in
motional response or affective state, and enhancing central 5-HT
ransmission decrease amygdala activation in response to aversive
timuli (Takahashi et al., 2005). Although there have been no PET
tudies on the relationship between 5-HT transmission and loss
version, circumstantial evidence suggests that central 5-HT tonehting: (A) parametric image of DA D1 receptor binding potential measured by
g and  ˛ of weighting function is shown.
might be associated with loss aversion. Enhancing 5-HT transmis-
sion by tryptophan load reduced the “reﬂection effect” (Murphy
et al., 2009), which refers to the fact that decision-makers tend to
prefer the guaranteed $50 gain to a 50/50 gamble to win  $100 or
no gain at all, showing risk-aversion. However, decision-makers
tend to prefer a 50/50 gamble to lose $100 or no loss at all to
the guaranteed $50 loss, showing risk-seeking. “Reﬂection effect”
and “framing effect” can be partially explained using loss aver-
sion. De Martino et al. (2006) reported that susceptibility to the
framing effect was  associated with amygdala activation. They also
reported that genetic variation in the promoter region of the 5-
HT transporter gene (5-HTTTLPR) predicted susceptibility to thetion for loss. 5-HT might ease the slope of value function for loss (loss tolerance:
green), and NE might intensify the slope (loss aversion: red). The value function is
usually assumed to be a power function v(x) = x , but we used common simplifying
assumptions that  is 1 for both value functions in gain and loss domains. The ratio
(loss/gain) of the slope of linear functions was indicated as .
272 H. Takahashi / Neuroscience Research 75 (2013) 269–274












































Nig. 4. Relationship between NET in the thalamus and loss aversion: (A) average
egative correlation between NET binding in the thalamus and loss aversion param
omozygosity for s allele showed higher loss aversion than l car-
iers (He et al., 2010). Although it is difﬁcult to estimate pre-and
ost-synaptic (and net) 5-HT transmission by genetic variation in
-HTTTLPR (Shioe et al., 2003), 5-HT neurotransmission seems to
ase the aversive reaction to ﬁnancial loss (Fig. 3).
In addition to 5-HT, a line of evidence suggests that norepi-
ephrine (NE) might be involved in loss aversion. The role of NE
n arousal is well established (Berridge and Waterhouse, 2003),
nd physiological arousal response was reported to be associated
ith behavioral loss aversion (Sokol-Hessner et al., 2009). Cen-
ral NE blockade by propranolol attenuated the sensitivity to the
agnitude of possible losses at gambles (Rogers et al., 2004). Lack
f an appropriate PET radioligand has prevented us from investi-
ating the role of central NE transmission in cognition, emotion
nd decision-making in vivo. However, (S,S)-18F-FMeNER-D2 has
ecently been developed as a radioligand for the measurement of
orepinephrine transporter for PET (Arakawa et al., 2008; Schou
t al., 2004). (S,S)-18F-FMeNER-D2 is a reboxetine analog and has
igh afﬁnity and high selectivity for norepinephrine transporter
Fig. 4A). We  utilized PET scans with (S,S)-[18F]FMeNER-D2 to
nvestigate the relationship between central NET and loss aver-
ion (Takahashi et al., 2013). Based on previous literatures, we were
nterested in the amygdala and PFC, but the relatively low expres-
ion of NET prevented reliable measurement of their NET binding
ith this radiologand. A NET-rich region available to PET imaging
ith this ligand is the thalamus. Therefore, we investigated the
elationship between thalamic NET binding and loss aversion.
Loss aversion parameters were determined outside the PET
canner using a 50:50 mixed gamble (gain–loss). This parameter
 is similar to the parameter in prospect theory but makes the
ommon simplifying assumptions of a linear rather than curvi-
inear value function (Fig. 3), and identical decision weights for
 0.5 probability of a gain or loss. The study revealed that there
as a negative correlation between  and NET binding in the thal-
mus (Fig. 4B). That is, individuals with low thalamic NET tend
o show pronounced aversive reaction to ﬁnancial losses. In other
ords, individuals with high thalamic NET tend to show more fear-
ess decision-making. Although NE has been implicated in arousal,
t was reported that NE also affects processing of salient infor-
ation (Berridge and Waterhouse, 2003). Neurons of the locus
oeruleus (LC), the major source of NE in the brain, are phasi-
ally evoked by salient or emotional stimuli (Aston-Jones et al.,
994), and phasic LC activation leads to NE release in target
ites (Berridge and Waterhouse, 2003). Enhancing NE tone by
E re-uptake inhibitor improves detection of emotional stimuliatially normalized summed PET image of (S,S)-[18F]FMeNER-D2 is shown and (B)
 is shown.
(De Martino et al., 2008), and blockade of central NE by propra-
nolol predominantly impairs processing of negatively emotional
stimuli (Cahill et al., 1994). Thus, PET ﬁndings suggest that indi-
viduals with low NET in the thalamus might show exaggerated or
prolonged effect of NE released by salient stimuli due to low re-
uptake, and consequently show pronounced emotional or arousal
response to losses relative to gains. Thalamic NET might be an indi-
rect mediator of the relationship between NE transmission and
loss aversion. Similarly to 5-HT transmission, Rasch et al. (2009)
reported that a genetic variation of ADRA2B, the gene encoding the
2b-adrenergic receptor, predicted amygdala responsivity to neg-
ative emotional stimuli. Future studies with a more appropriate
radioligand for measuring NET in the amygdala and PFC, which are
implicated in loss aversion, are recommended. For the present, it
is not unreasonable to suppose that central NE transmission con-
tributes to shaping the slope of the value function in the loss domain
(Fig. 3).
In a clinical setting, NET blocker, atomoxetine, is used in
the pharmacotherapy of Attention-Deﬁcit Hyperactivity Disorder
(ADHD). ADHD patients are known to show impulsive and reckless
decision-making and have high comorbidity rates of drug addiction
and gamble addiction (pathological gambling) (Breyer et al., 2009;
Pattij and Vanderschuren, 2008). Our ﬁnding suggests that NET
blockers might shift ADHD patients’ decision-making from reck-
less (less loss-aversive) to more cautious (more loss-aversive) by
reducing NET binding. Based on intuitive assumption that patho-
logical gamblers show diminished aversive responses to ﬁnancial
losses, along with ADHD, one can make a prediction that NET
inhibitors might be beneﬁcial for pathological gambling. However,
pathological gambling seems to be a heterogeneous disorder with
various social and biological backgrounds. Diagnostic criteria of
pathological gambling are similar to drug addiction, but one char-
acteristic feature of pathological gambling is chasing (American
Psychiatric Association, 1994). Pathological gamblers chase their
losses and keep gambling in order to get even (but they end up
piling up even more losses, and often debts, in reality). Chasing
is phenomenon reﬂecting the unwillingness to accept losses and
is similar to the disposition effect or reﬂection effect, which can
be explained by loss aversion. Thus, contrary to intuitive predic-
tion, some types of pathological gamblers might show exaggerated
loss aversion. Compared to the DA system, the role of the NE sys-
tem in reward processing has been less studied, and speciﬁcally,
the research ﬁeld that would elucidate the role of NE in decision-
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. Conclusion and future direction
The PET technique is a powerful tool for investigating the rela-
ionship between neurotransmitters and decision-making in vivo
n human. However, standard PET studies tell us only the cor-
elational relationship. Complementary pharmacological studies
s well as animal studies are needed for a full understanding of
he causal relationship. Another challenge is the translation of lab
vidence into daily-life decision-making and behavior. Laboratory
tudies are typically conducted in a controlled and simpliﬁed envi-
onment. Just how well neurochemical information improves the
redictability of decision-making model in a more naturalistic set-
ing should be tested (Levallois et al., 2012). Mis-estimating risk
ould lead not only to drug/gamble addiction but also to other
orms of neuropsychiatric disorders such as schizophrenia and
epression. An interdisciplinary approach combining molecular
maging techniques, cognitive neuroscience, economics and clini-
al psychiatry will provide new perspectives for understanding the
eurobiology of impaired decision-making in neuropsychiatric dis-
rders as well as their drug development (Takahashi et al., 2012b;
akahashi, 2012a).
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